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INTRODUCTION

On June 5, 2012, voters in the state of Wisconsin and in the
California cities of San Jose and San Diego dealt a severe blow to the
unions representing many of their respective government employees.
In the Badger State, Governor Scott Walker survived a recall vote
brought on by his aggressive measures limiting Wisconsin’s public
unions’ rights to bargain collectively over aspects of their
employment contracts. 1 The California cities’ ballot measures
dramatically increased the amounts that city workers2 contribute to
their pension plans, among other changes.3
The elections represented not only the most recent in a long
series of blows to labor unions, but perhaps portended things to come
as well. 4 The trend seemed undeniable. Long before the 2012
special elections, it was widely acknowledged that union influence
was declining.5 By 2012, union membership was at a ninety-seven-

* John Stanley is a third-year student at Pepperdine University School of
Law.
1

See Brian Montopoli, Scott Walker Wins Wisconsin Recall Election, CBS
NEWS (June 5, 2012, 9:03 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_16257447954-503544/scott-walker-wins-wisconsin-recall-election/.
2
The reforms were not directed solely at local public unions, but union
representatives opposed the actions and vowed to fight the reforms in court. See
Catherine Saillant & Tony Perry, 2 Big Cities OK Cuts to Worker Pension Costs,
L.A. TIMES (June 7, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/ 2012/jun/07/local/la-mepensions-20120607.
3
In San Jose, city workers may now choose between increasing the
amount they pay into their pension fund to 13% from 5%í11% and accepting a
plan with reduced benefits. Id. San Diego eliminated defined benefit pensions for
new hires and adopted a 401k retirement plan. Id.
4
David Kocieniewski, Unions, at Center of Wisconsin Recall Vote, Suffer
a New Setback in Its Outcome, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2012, at A17 (noting that,
among its various impacts, Walker’s reelection will likely embolden politicians
elsewhere to take similar actions and hurt union recruiting in the future).
5
See PETER FAIRBROTHER & GERARD GRIFFIN, CHANGING PROSPECTS
FOR TRADE UNIONISM: COMPARISONS BETWEEN SIX COUNTRIES 1 (Peter
Fairbrother & Gerard Griffin eds., 2002) (acknowledging “massively” declining
union membership in the 1980s and 1990s); MICHAEL D. YATES, WHY UNIONS
MATTER í G HG   FDWDORJXLQJ WKH SROLWLFDO DQG HFRQRPLF FKDOOHQJHV
modern unions face); Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, The Wisconsin Union Fight
Isn’t About Benefits. It’s About Labor’s Influence, WASH. POST (Mar. 6, 2011),
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year low.6 Popular defeats at the ballot box could only confirm the
fears of organized labor and its supporters that the influence of
unions, both public and private, waned.7
Adding insult (and more injury) to injury, a mere three weeks
after their high profile electoral losses, public unions were delivered
another jolt by the Supreme Court in the form of Knox v. Service
Employees International Union, Local 1000. 8 The Knox decision
effectively limits government unions’ ability to raise money for
future political expenditures by prohibiting “special assessments” on
nonmembers without their consent. 9 This note will offer a brief
history of public sector unions in America and introduce the reader to
the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) and its role as a
political player. It will then lay the legal foundation on which Knox
rests and examine the Knox decision itself. This note concludes that
Knox is a significant event in the long-term decline of organized
public sector labor, which is bound to dwindle along with unionized
labor generally.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/03/04/AR201103040
6264.html (arguing that powerful forces are succeeding in their attempts to
“destroy [organized labor’s] remaining clout”).
6
Adam Davidson, Organize This, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY MAG., Feb. 3,
2013, at MM14.
7
The passage of the Wisconsin bill resulted in large-scale protests at the
statehouse in Madison. Demonstrators famously “occupied” the capitol building
before legislators passed the law, leading police to remove dozens of people and
lock down the building. See Jonathon M. Seidl, Capitol Chaos: Police Drag
Protestors from Wis. Statehouse, THE BLAZE (Mar. 10, 2011, 1:56 PM),
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2011/03/10/capitol-chaos-police-drag-protestersfrom-wis-capitol/ (discussing an embedded local news video that displays and
discusses the locked down Wisconsin Statehouse). The bill was so controversial
that Wisconsin’s Democratic state senators fled to Illinois to deny Republicans the
necessary quorum of twenty members in order to vote. See Jeff Mayers,
Democrats Flee Wisconsin to Protest Union Curbs, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2011),
http://www.reuters.com/article/
2011/02/18/us-wisconsin-protestsidUSTRE71H01920110218. California’s November 2012 ballot propositions 30
and 32 and their significance will be considered later. See generally Proposition
2012
Cheat
Sheet:
California’s
Nov.
6
Election,
KCET,
http://www.kcet.org/news/ballotbrief/ballot-measures/california-propositionsguide-2012-cheat-sheet.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2013) (providing information on
propositions 30 and 32).
8
132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
9
See infra Part III (discussing such special assessments and their legality
at the heart of Knox).
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BACKGROUND

Unions in the United States

Workers in the United States have organized to pursue their
interests in a unified manner since the early nineteenth century.10 For
example, American shoemakers attempted to create “closed shops”11
as early as 1806. 12 The 1935, the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)13 officially gave workers the right to form and join unions
and “obligated employers to bargain collectively with unions selected
by a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit.”14
The NLRA did not apply to government entities or their employees,
however.15 Public unions are a more recent phenomenon.16
In 1958, Wisconsin, the state now leading the effort to
diminish public union influence, was the first jurisdiction to allow
government workers to unionize. 17 President John F. Kennedy’s
Executive Order 10988 granted federal employees the right to form
unions in 1962.18 Many states and municipalities soon followed the
10

See YATES, supra note 5, at 35–37.
A closed shop arrangement exists where only union members are
allowed to work at a given shop. Id. at 36.
12
Id.
13
29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012) (also commonly known as the Wagner
Act).
14
The 1935 Passage of the Wagner Act, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD,
http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-history/1935-passage-wagner-act (last visited
Feb. 7, 2013).
15
Government entities are not considered employees under the terms of
the Wagner Act. Paul Moreno, How Public Unions Became So Powerful, WALL
ST.
J.
(Sept.
11,
2012,
7:55
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444017504577645550224040874.
html?mod=wsj_Opinion_leadTop.
16
Traditionally, the idea of public sector unionization was viewed with
hostility. Id. Even presidents known for their progressive views like Woodrow
Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt were strongly opposed to an organized government
workforce. Id.
17
Id.
18
Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. § 521 (1959–1963). Unlike private
sector (and some state and local government) unions, most federal government
unions cannot collectively bargain over wages and benefits, and cannot go on
strike. Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker Says Most Federal Employees Do Not Have
Collective
Bargaining
for
Benefits
or
Pay,
POLITIFACT,
11
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federal government’s lead.19 While union membership overall has
steadily declined since the 1950s, 20 public union membership has
trended upward since at least the 1970s. 21 By 2012, the union
membership rate was more than five times greater among public
sector workers than among their private sector counterparts—35.9%
to 6.6%, respectively. 22 However, since 2009, public union
membership has been shrinking as well.23
B.

SEIU, Political Player

With over one million state and local government members,
SEIU is the second largest public employee union in the nation.24
Over 350,000 of those members are in California, where Local 1000

http://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/statements/2011/mar/02/scottwalker/wisconsin-gov-scott-walker-says-mostfederal-emplo/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2013). They can, however, negotiate “working
conditions,” which can include a wide range of issues from scheduling and
vacation time to promotion practices. Id.
19
Moreno, supra note 15.
20
FAIRBROTHER & GRIFFIN, supra note 5, at 4.
21
Review & Outlook, The Public-Union Ascendancy, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3,
2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703837004575013424060649464.
html.
22
Economic News Release: Union Members Summary, DEP’T LAB.
LAB.
STAT.
(Jan.
23,
2013,
10:00
AM),
BUREAU
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm. Public sector union members
also outnumbered their private counterparts 7.3 million to 7 million. Combined,
union workers accounted for 11.2% of the overall workforce. Id.
23
Access to Historical Data for Union Membership, Table 3: Union
Affiliation of Employed Wage and Salary Workers by Occupation and Industry,
Members of Unions, Government, DEP’T LAB. BUREAU LAB. STAT.,
http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cpslutab3.htm (select “Public Sector” row,
“Member of Unions - Total” column; then click “Retrieve Data”) (last visited Oct.
1, 2013).
24
Including private sector members, SEIU has over two million members.
About SEIU, SEIU.ORG, http://www.seiu.org/our-union/ (last visited Feb. 9,
2013). American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME) is the nation’s largest public sector union with over 1.6 million active
and
retired
members.
About
AFSCME,
AFSCME,
http://www.afscme.org/union/about (last visited Feb. 9, 2013).
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of Knox is located. 25 SEIU also claims to be the fastest growing
union in North America.26
Along with its considerable size comes considerable political
power. In 2012 alone, SEIU contributed over $20 million to
candidates, political groups (for example, the Democratic National
Committee), or political action committees. 27 According to the
Center for Responsive Politics, SEIU is the fifth largest political
donor in the last twenty-three years, with over $50 million in direct
political contributions.28 A White House visitor log released during
President Obama’s first year in office revealed that former SEIU
president, Andrew Stern, had visited twenty-two times, making him
the most frequent White House guest. 29 It was an attempt to flex
political muscle that led to the dispute in Knox.30
III.

LEGAL FOUNDATION

The Knox decision rests primarily on two prior cases dealing
with public union fee collection and political expenditures. Abood v.
25

California has over 700,000 SEIU members when private sector
workers
are
included.
SEIU
in
California,
SEIU.ORG,
http://www.seiuca.org/about/seiu-in-california/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2013). Local
1000 spent around $4.3 million on political causes in 2012, mostly to defeat
Proposition 32. See What SEIU Local 1000 Spent on Politics This Year, THE
SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 27, 2012), http://blogs.sacbee.com/the_state_worker/
2012/11/seiu-local-1000s-political-action.html.
26
About SEIU, supra note 24.
27
Summary of SEIU Contributions, Lobbying, and Spending Data,
FOR
RESPONSIVE
POL.,
CENTER
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id=D000000077 (last visited Mar.
17, 2013).
28
Top All-Time Donors, 1989–2012, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POL.,
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/list.php (last visited Oct. 1, 2013). AFSCME
came in second overall with over $68 million in political contributions. Id. These
numbers do not include the tens of millions of dollars spent to directly influence
elections, i.e., not donated to candidates or other political organizations. About
FOR
RESPONSIVE
POLITICS,
CENTER
Rankings,
http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/include/rankings_pop.php (last visited Mar. 17,
2013).
29
Susan Davis, SEIU’s Stern Tops White House Visitor List, WALL ST. J.
BLOGS (Oct. 30, 2009, 6:31 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2009/10/30/seiusstern-tops-white-house-visitor-list/.
30
Id.
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Detroit Board of Education 31 acknowledged the First Amendment
issues inherent in public union political contributions, but maintained
that agency shop arrangements 32 were permissible under the
Constitution.33 Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson34
clarified the requirements that must be followed by unions in order to
collect regular fees from nonmembers without violating their rights.35
A.

Abood v. Detroit Board of Education

Nonunion teachers challenged a Michigan law36 specifically
allowing for agency shops whereby nonmembers would pay the
equivalent of union dues despite their desire to refrain from
membership.37 The Court took the case to determine whether such an
arrangement “violates the constitutional rights of government
employees who object to public-sector unions as such or to various
union activities financed by the compulsory service fees.”38
Abood itself rests upon the reasoning in two prior labor
decisions: Railway Employes’ [sic] Department v. Hanson, 39 and
Machinists v. Street.40 Together, the cases stand for the proposition
that employees may be compelled to contribute to expenses incurred
by the union representing a shop in the bargaining process, but that
use of the contributions is restricted by the First Amendment.41
The Court began by declining to take a different course in
Abood than it had in Hanson or Street merely because the employer

31

431 U.S. 209 (1977).
Id. at 211. An agency shop is one that employs both union and
nonunion workers, but a union bargains on behalf of all employees. Id.
Nonmembers pay chargeable expenses to help defray the costs of collective
bargaining. Id.
33
Id. The nature of the First Amendment issues are discussed infra in Part
III.A.
34
475 U.S. 292 (1986).
35
Id.
36
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.210(1)(c) (1970).
37
Abood, 431 U.S. at 211.
38
Id. Under the agreement, new teachers would have sixty days in which
to pay the required amount to the union or be subject to discharge. Id. at 212.
39
351 U.S. 225 (1956).
40
367 U.S. 740 (1961).
41
Abood, 431 U.S. at 217–20.
32
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was the state itself.42 Notably, the union shop at issue in Hanson was
considered “to result from governmental action.43 The constitutional
constraints on a government employee union were to be analyzed in
the same fashion as in the prior cases dealing with private sector
unions.44
The Court was similarly unmoved by the plaintiff’s
contention that “collective bargaining in the public sector is
inherently ‘political’ and thus requires a different result under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.”45 After noting that it is indeed
political, rather than financial, pressure that primarily functions to
check government employers in the collective bargaining process, the
Court determined that such a distinction did not alter the calculus
determining the legality of the fee arrangement as a whole.46 Writing
for the majority, Justice Stewart bluntly stated, “The differences
between public- and private-sector collective bargaining simply do
not translate into differences in First Amendment rights.”47
That said, there are constitutional limitations on how a union
may spend fee money collected from nonmembers. 48 The First
Amendment prohibits government unions from compelling
nonmembers from whom they receive fees to subsidize nonbargaining expenditures with which they disagree as a condition of

42

Id. at 224. Discussing the congressional intent behind the federal labor
laws, the Court pointed out, “The desirability of labor peace is no less important in
the public sector, nor is the risk of ‘free riders’ any smaller.” Id.
43
Id. at 226.
44
See id. at 229–30 (“Public employees are not basically different from
private employees . . . . The uniqueness of public employment is not in the
employees nor in the work performed; the uniqueness is in the special character of
the employer.”). In other words, the fact that the employer is a state actor is not
germane to the analysis of the rights of the employee or the union, both of whom
remain private actors.
45
Id. at 227.
46
Id. at 229. The Court pointed out that the free speech concerns of both
private and public employees are essentially the same, so their interests ought to be
given the same weight regardless of the status of their employers. Id.
47
Id. at 232. Justice Powell, whose concurrence was joined by Justice
Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger, would have made a greater distinction
between public and private employers than did the majority. See id. at 245–60
(Powell, J., dissenting).
48
See, e.g., id. at 235–36.
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employment.49 Money spent in furtherance of political or ideological
causes must be derived from contributions by employees who “do not
object to advancing those ideas and who are not coerced into doing
so against their will by the threat of loss of governmental
employment.” 50 Abood thus established the broad outlines of the
later agency shop cases: agency shops are permissible, but unions
cannot spend a nonmember’s fees on political or ideological goals
without his consent. Hudson would clarify the methods for assuring
that unions did not violate their nonmembers’ rights.
B.

Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson

After the Illinois legislature authorized public unions within
the state to implement the agency shop arrangement held to be
constitutional in Abood, the Chicago Board of Education and the
Chicago Teachers Union quickly began requiring nonmember
teachers to contribute fees via paycheck deductions.51 In an attempt
to satisfy the constitutional requirement of “preventing compulsory
subsidization of ideological activity by employees who object thereto
without restricting the Union’s ability to require every employee to
contribute to the cost of collective-bargaining activities,” 52 the
teachers’ union created a procedure for dealing with objections by
nonmembers.53
Initially, the union made a determination of what percentage
of its expenses was accrued on account of causes “germane to its
duties as collective-bargaining agent.” 54 The union calculated that
95% of its total costs was the legitimate, “proportionate share”
chargeable to nonmembers.55 No objections could be made prior to
49

Id. at 234. Forced contributions are every bit as much a constitutional
violation as preventing a voluntary contribution. Id. at 235. In addition to
contributing to collective bargaining, nonmembers must also help defray costs
related to contract administration and grievance adjustment. Id. at 225–26.
50
Id. at 236.
51
Chic. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 294
(1986).
52
Id. at 302 (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 237).
53
Id. at 296.
54
Id. at 294 (quoting Ellis v. Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 447 (1984)).
55
Id. at 295–96. This estimate was made based on financial records from
the previous year. The actual amount of political or ideological expenditures was
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the collection of the fee.56 If a teacher objected after the fee was
assessed, the procedure provided that the teacher alert the president
of the union in writing within thirty days. 57 Then, the union’s
executive committee would consider the objection.
If the
committee’s decision were appealed, an executive board would
reconsider.58 As a last resort, the union would pay for arbitration of
the dispute.59 If the objector won at any level, he or she was entitled
to a refund and a reduction of future paycheck deductions.60 Hudson
dealt with whether such a procedure could survive First Amendment
scrutiny.61 The Court found that it did not.62
The first problem the Court saw with the union’s plan was
that its only remedy was a rebate. 63 A return of funds after an
erroneous deduction did not avoid the risk that nonmembers’ fees
would be used, even temporarily, for unconstitutional purposes. 64
Next, the Court discussed the inadequacy of the information given to
nonmembers regarding the calculation of their proportionate share.65
Lastly, the Court specified a requirement that employee objections be
4.6%, but the union rounded to 5% to provide the nonmembers a “cushion.” Id. at
295.
56
Id. at 296.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 304. The teachers’ union in Hudson also argued that such a
procedure was not in violation of the Constitution because it placed the plaintiff’s
money in escrow pending the outcome of the case, and therefore, their fees could
not have been used against their wishes. Id. at 299. However, for purposes of
precedential value, the procedure itself is much more significant to Knox, and this
note therefore focuses on the procedure. See infra Part IV.
62
Hudson, 475 U.S. at 301, 310.
63
Id. at 305.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 306. While the burden of objecting is on the worker, an employee
must be given notice of how his share of expenses was calculated if he is to make
an informed objection. See id. at 306–07. This would come to be colloquially
known as “Hudson notice.” See, e.g., Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local
1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2285 (2012). Significantly, the Court made clear that the
method used to determine the fees in this case, namely estimates based on financial
statements from the previous year, was acceptable given the difficulties of making
precise predictions regarding costs. Hudson, 475 U.S. at 307 n.18.
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heard in an “expeditious, fair, and objective manner.” 66 While an
objection is pending, the amount in controversy should be held in
escrow. 67 In sum, a constitutional nonmember union fee must be
assessed only after adequate explanation of its grounds is subject to
prompt challenge before a neutral authority, and should be placed in
escrow pending the outcome of the hearing.68
Thus, in light of Abood and Hudson, a basic framework
emerges. Government employees and employers may create agency
shops represented by unions in collective bargaining. 69 The union
representing the shop may require nonunion employees to pay a fee
for chargeable expenses (i.e., those related to the duties of the union
as collective bargainer). 70 However, the union may not spend the
money assessed to a nonmember for political or ideological purposes
absent the worker’s consent.71 Finally, upon a worker’s reasonable
objection, the objector’s fees must be placed in escrow and the
worker’s claim must be promptly heard by an impartial decision
maker.72 This is the lens through which the Supreme Court would
view the dispute in Knox v. Service Employees International Union,
Local 1000.
IV.

KNOX V. SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL
1000
A.

The Facts

Like Michigan and Illinois, California allows public
employees to form agency shops.73 The practice of one such shop,

66

Hudson, 475 U.S. at 307. The Court noted that the system at issue was
controlled, at all times, entirely by the union. Id. The Court strongly implied that
decisions regarding validity of nonmember payments should be determined by
someone outside of the union. See id. at 307–09.
67
Id. at 310.
68
Id.
69
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232 (1977).
70
Id. at 217–20.
71
Hudson, 475 U.S. at 305.
72
Id. at 310.
73
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3502.5(a) (West 2010).
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SEIU Local 1000 (the Local), 74 was to charge all represented
employees, whether union members or not, the full amount of union
dues.75 If and when nonmembers objected to the assessment upon
receiving Hudson notice, the union would only deduct the amount it
calculated as chargeable expenses.76 The Local’s Hudson notice also
contained a clause stating that the fee was “subject to increase at any
time without further notice.”77
In June of 2005, then-California Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger called for a special election in November to vote on
various government budget-cutting measures. 78 Public employee
unions actively opposed the measures. 79 In order to fund its
campaign against the ballot proposals, the Local instituted a “special
assessment” in the amount of an additional 25% of regular fees on all
employees the Local represented—after the thirty-day period for
objecting to the Hudson notice had ended.80

74

SEIU Local 1000 is California’s largest state (government) employee
union.
About Local 1000, SEIU LOCAL 1000, http://seiu1000.org/yourunion/about.php (last visited Oct. 3, 2013). It represents 95,000 workers in nine
“bargaining units” based on occupation categories. Id.
75
See Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2285
(2012).
76
Id. For 2005, the year at issue, chargeable expenses were calculated at
56.35% of full union dues. Id.
77
Id.
78
See id. Proposition 76, geared at controlling state spending, would have
limited outlays from the state’s general and special funds to the level of the prior
year plus an amount determined by average past increases. Proposition 76: Key
Issues and Fiscal Effects, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE (Sept. 30,
2005), http://www.lao.ca.gov/2005/prop_76/prop_76_093005.htm. The cap would
have likely affected discretionary, but not entitlement spending. See id.
79
See id. SEIU was primarily concerned about Propositions 75 and 76
which respectively would have required unions to obtain employees affirmative
consent in writing before charging them fees to fund political operations and given
the governor power to reduce state spending on public employees. Id. Public
employee unions contributed nearly $10 million to oppose Governor
Schwarzenegger’s proposals. Id. (citing Carla Marinucci & John Wildermuth,
Schwarzenegger Adds Prop. 75 to His Agenda, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 18, 2005, at A17, available at http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Schwarzenegger-adds-Prop75-to-his-agenda-2568986.php).
80
Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2285. The total fee for most members after the
additional 25% would be 1.25% of their monthly salary. Id. at 2286.
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The notice of the fee increase specifically stated that the funds
were an “Emergency Temporary Assessment to Build a Political
Fight-Back Fund” (the Fight-Back Fund).81 The Local went on to
make clear that “[t]he Fund [would] not be used for regular costs of
the union—such as office rent, staff salaries, or routine equipment
replacement, etc.” 82 The money would instead be spent on
television, radio, direct mail advertising, voter registration and
education, and a get-out-the-vote campaign.83 Employees were not
given an opportunity to opt-out of the special assessment.84 A class
action was filed on behalf of 28,000 nonunion employees upon
whom the special assessment was imposed.85
B.

District Court

The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff
nonmembers as to the question of whether the Local’s special
assessment violated the nonmembers’ First Amendment rights.86 The
court found that the plaintiffs did not receive adequate notice of the
fee increase, and failure to object to the original Hudson notice did
not constitute consent to the special assessment.87 The appropriate
remedy, according to the district court, was new notice giving
nonmembers forty-five days in which to opt-out of paying into the
Fight-Back Fund.88 Those who objected were to be issued a “refund
of the nonchargeable portion of the [special assessment], with
interest.”89
81
82

Id.
Id. (quoting the Local’s fee increase proposal) (internal quotation marks

omitted).
83

Id.
Id. Employees who originally objected upon receipt of the annual
Hudson notice were only assessed 56.35% of the special assessment. Id.
85
Id.
86
See Knox v. Westly, No. 2:05-cv-02198-MCE-KJM, 2008 WL 850128,
at *12 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), rev'd sub nom. Knox v. Cal. State Emps. Ass'n,
Local 1000, 628 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated sub nom. Knox v. Cal. State
Emps. Ass'n, Local 1000, 692 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2012).
87
Id. at *10–11.
88
See id. at *12.
89
Id. at *10. The court was unimpressed by the defendant union’s
argument that Hudson dealt with regular annual fees and not a special assessment.
84
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The Court of Appeals

A divided three-judge panel reversed the ruling of the district
court. According to the Ninth Circuit panel, Hudson established a
balancing test for determining the adequacy of union notice. 91 In
addition to “balancing of the ‘right’ of the union to collect an agency
fee against the First Amendment rights of nonmembers”,92 the Ninth
Circuit also inquired into whether the system of notice and
subsequent remedial procedures took proper account of “the union,
the [public employer] and nonmember employees.” 93 Under this
analysis, the court concluded that the Local did not violate Hudson.94
The majority took issue with the district court’s failure to
account for the difficulty of predicting future expenses under the
normal method of chargeable expense calculations.95 After all, any
mistakes in the chargeability determination will necessarily average
out the year after they are made when the current year’s accounting is
factored in.96 The panel maintained that the district court’s remedy
of renewed notice when an out-of-the-ordinary fee increase was to be
imposed would be unworkable for a union.97
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Wallace claimed that the majority
misconstrued the Hudson test as well as the nature of the union’s
claim to nonmembers’ money. 98 His assertions would soon be
echoed by the Supreme Court, which took the case to decide
90

See id. at *11. According to the court, such a literal reading of Hudson amounted
to using a loophole to subvert the Constitution’s First Amendment protections. See
id. (“[N]o self-asserted loophole will allow Defendants to avoid the Constitution.”).
90
See Knox v. Cal. State Emps. Ass'n, Local 1000, 628 F.3d 1115, 1117
(9th Cir. 2010), rev'd sub nom. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132
S. Ct. 2277 (2012).
91
Id. at 1117, 1119–20.
92
Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2291.
93
Knox, 628 F.3d at 1120 (alteration in original) (quoting Grunwald v.
San Bernardino City Unified Sch. Dist., 994 F.2d 1370, 1376 n.7 (9th Cir. 1993))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
94
Id.
95
See id. at 1121.
96
See id.
97
Id. at 1122.
98
Id. at 1127–28 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
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“whether the First Amendment allows a public-sector union to
require objecting nonmembers to pay a special fee for the purpose of
financing the union’s political and ideological activities.”99
V.

KNOX AT THE SUPREME COURT
A.

Alito for the Majority
1.

Mootness

The Local may have signaled that it anticipated a reversal of
the Ninth Circuit by its conduct before the Knox case was argued in
front of the Supreme Court in January of 2012. After the Court
granted certiorari, the union offered refunds to the class members and
then moved to dismiss the case as moot.100 Writing for the majority,
Justice Alito explained that a case will generally not be dismissed on
ground of mootness when doing so would allow one of the parties to
immediately resume the disputed conduct without being
sanctioned. 101 Furthermore, a live controversy existed as to the
adequacy of the notice of the proposed refunds.102 Thus, the Court
proceeded to the merits.103
2.

Compulsory Subsidization of Speech

Justice Alito began by reaffirming the concept that free
speech includes being able to choose “what not to say.”104 Likewise,
freedom of association “presupposes a freedom not to associate.”105
Justice Alito then drew a connection between compelled speech and
association and compelled funding of speech.106 Drawing on United
99

See Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2284

(2012).
100

Id. at 2287.
See id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 2288.
104
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of
N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
105
Id. (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
106
Id.
101
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States v. United Foods, Inc., 107 he laid out the two-part test for
upholding the compulsory subsidization of private speech.108 “First,
there must be a comprehensive regulatory scheme involving a
‘mandated association’ among those who are required to pay the
subsidy.”109 Next, “compulsory fees can be levied only insofar as
they are a ‘necessary incident’ of the ‘larger regulatory purpose
which justified the required association.’” 110 According to Justice
Alito, the union-nonmember relationship is not one in which forced
subsidization of speech can constitutionally take place.111 Therefore,
nonmembers are entitled to full First Amendment protection.112
3.

Hudson Notice and the First Amendment

Justice Alito proceeded to state that, “unions have no
constitutional entitlement to the fees of nonmember-employees.”113
In fact, he asserted that the whole notion of an opt-out system—as
opposed to a system whereby nonmember employees would have to
affirmatively consent to a paycheck deduction for union expenses—
which has become the norm, came about only because of a “historical
accident.” 114 Justice Alito made clear the majority’s concern that
opt-out fee arrangements for nonmembers push the acceptable limits
of the First Amendment. 115 Given the tenuous grip on legality of
regular union fee collection, the special assessment at issue certainly
could not stand.116

107

533 U.S. 405 (2001).
Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2289.
109
Id. (quoting United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 414 (2001)).
110
Id. (quoting United Foods, 533 U.S. at 414).
111
See id.
112
See id.
113
Id. at 2291 (quoting Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177,
185 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
114
Id. at 2290. Justice Alito detailed union fee cases from International
Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961), to Chicago Teachers Union,
Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986), and submitted that acceptance of optout systems would not have arisen but for unique factual circumstances in the
precedential cases. See Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2290.
115
See id. at 2291.
116
See id.
108
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In light of the fact that some plaintiffs did not object to the
original Hudson notice, the majority “[saw] no justification for the
union’s failure to provide a fresh Hudson notice.” 117 The Court
reasoned that informed consent to union fees could only be given if
employees had fair notice of how their contributions would be
used. 118 Under normal circumstances, yearly Hudson notice is
sufficient because nonmembers will have a “fair opportunity” to
consider the use of their fee. 119 However, when there is a special
assessment, the rationale for allowing the yearly opt-out
disappears.120 The Court noted that this case provided a particularly
illustrative example of the potential consequences of ineffective
Hudson notice because of the nature of the contested ballot
propositions. 121 The union was actively opposing Proposition 75,
which, if passed, would have instituted an opt-in system for
nonmembers who wished to contribute to the Local’s political
goals.122 In effect, the Local was forcing nonmembers to contribute
to a campaign against their own financial interests.123
The Local argued for the adequacy under the First
Amendment of its existing opt-out framework.124 Its main contention
was that nonmembers who would have objected to the special
assessment would be compensated by opting out upon receipt of the
next Hudson notice the following year.125 This is because the union,
upon accounting for the political use of the special assessment, would
lower the percentage of normal members’ dues that were attributable

117

Id.
Id.
119
Id. (quoting Hudson, 475 U.S. at 303) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Additionally, the logic behind annual Hudson notice is based on the
assumption that the proportion of chargeable to nonchargeable expenses will be
relatively constant. Id. at 2293.
120
See id. at 2292.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
See id. The Court pointed out that it would have been easy for the
Local to put its notice of the impending fee increase in the form of a Hudson notice
and allow nonmembers to object. Id.
124
See id.
125
Id.
118
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to chargeable expenses. 126 That is to say, nonmembers would
eventually break even.
The Court disagreed that the potential for breaking even in
terms of chargeable expenses provided sufficient First Amendment
protection to nonmembers.127 It reasoned that such a system would
be tantamount to a compulsory loan by nonmembers, the proceeds of
which could be used to fund projects they found repugnant. 128
Justice Alito repeated the Court’s concern with even the existing optout framework and explained that any further First Amendment
impingement was simply unacceptable.129
Not only was the Local’s notice ineffective as it concerned
the plaintiff nonmembers who had not opted out after receiving the
regular annual Hudson notice, but the union also violated the First
Amendment rights of the nonmembers who had opted out in the first
instance.130 The Local charged objectors the same percentage of the
special assessment as it charged of the annual assessment: 56.35%.131
Given that the union acknowledged that the new fees were going
specifically to support a political effort, however, there was no reason
to suppose the chargeable portion, if any, of the special assessment
would be anywhere near that number.132
The Local suggested that the nonmembers who objected at
the outset, and thus had paid only 56.35% of the special assessment,
actually came out ahead in terms of the total fees assessed to them.133
As it turned out, the union claimed, the actual amount of chargeable
expenses for 2005 was at least 66.26%.134 Therefore, those members
who paid 56.35% of both the original and special assessment paid
less than they could legally have been required to pay.
Justice Alito offered two reasons why this reasoning did not
persuade the Court.135 First, the majority objected to the expansive
126

See id.
Id. at 2292–93.
128
Id.
129
See id. at 2293, 2295.
130
See id. at 2293.
131
Id.
132
See id.
133
Id. at 2294.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 2294–95.
127
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view the Local took of what constituted chargeable expenses.136 For
example, the union assumed that expenditures towards “lobbying . . .
the electorate” and defeating Proposition 76 were properly counted as
chargeable expenses and thus deductible from nonmembers’ pay.137
The Court countered that such a broad definition of what could be
considered a chargeable expense would essentially “eviscerate the
limitation on the use of compulsory fees to support unions’
controversial political activities.”138
Second, the Court explained that, unless the amount of
chargeable expenses could be accurately predicted (which the Local
contended was impossible), then the union had an obligation to err on
the side of not charging nonmembers up front.139 The rationale for
this rule is that if the nonmember is overcharged, there is a risk that
the nonmember’s First Amendment rights will be violated by using
that money to subsidize speech with which he or she disagrees.140
On the other hand, if the nonmember is undercharged, there is no risk
of any party’s rights being infringed. 141 The risk associated with
under or overpayment should fall on the union—who will make up
the difference upon the next assessment—not the nonmember.142
The majority ended by requiring unions both to “provide a
fresh Hudson notice” and to receive the affirmative consent of
nonmembers before imposing a special assessment. 143 This result
was compelled by the already substantial impingement on First
Amendment rights by virtue of current opt-out systems. 144 Any
further offense to nonmembers’ free speech rights would be

136

Id. at 2294.
See id. (quoting Brief for Respondent at 51, Knox v. Service
Employees Intern Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012) (No. 10–1121), 2011
WL 5908951, at *51) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Local argued that
the opposition to Proposition 76 should count as chargeable because, if it passed,
the measure would have undermined the union’s effectiveness as a collective
bargainer. Id.
138
Id. at 2295.
139
See id.
140
See id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 2296.
144
See id. at 2295.
137
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intolerable.145 Thus, the general rule that individuals should not be
required to subsidize private speech must prevail.146
B.

Justice Sotomayor’s Concurrence147

Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg joined the Court’s judgment
because they agreed that the Local did not comply with Hudson since
no new notice was issued before the additional fee was assessed.148
However, Justice Sotomayor explained that, in her opinion, the
holding should have ended there. 149 She pointed out that neither
party specifically asked the Court to rule on whether an opt-in
provision was necessary. 150 She also referred to the Court’s own
rules for the proposition that the Court should only consider
questions “set out in the petition.”151 Furthermore, no prior Supreme
Court case had ever brought up the possibility that the common optout method of fee assessment was inadequate.152 Since neither party
thought such a holding was necessary to resolve the case, the Court
should not have gone out of its way to decide the issue.153
145

See id.
Id.
147
See id. at 2296–99 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg
joined Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence. See id. at 2296.
148
Id. at 2296–97.
149
See id. at 2296, 2297.
150
See id.
151
Id. at 2297 (quoting SUP. CT. R. 14.1(a) (2013)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
152
Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring). The majority countered that no case
had yet dealt with the issue of a special, as opposed to annual, assessment, and that
this distinction is what led to the need for the opt-in provision. See id. at 2296 n.9.
153
See id. at 2297–98. Justice Sotomayor turned Justice Alito’s words
against him by quoting his opinion in NASA v. Nelson: “appellate courts do not sit
as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of
legal questions presented and argued by the parties before them.” Id. at 2298
(quoting NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 757 n.10 (2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
The majority contended that deciding the case on the assumption that an
opt-out regime was constitutionally permissible would be akin to presuming any
other unconstitutional proposition to be valid unless it was set out in the petition.
Id. at 2296 n.9. Justice Sotomayor responded that, if the constitutional issue was
not properly framed, then the Court should not have granted certiorari, or,
alternatively, asked for supplemental briefing. Id. at 2298 n.2.
146
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Justice Sotomayor went on to assert that the majority’s
position was unclear in addition to being unwarranted.154 She posited
a series of questions to which she found the Court’s new rule lacking
an answer. 155 She pondered, “What procedures govern this new
world of fee collection?”156
But perhaps Justice Sotomayor and Justice Ginsburg’s
greatest concern was that the language used by the majority strongly
suggested that the line of union fee cases from Street to Hudson “may
not long endure.”157 The concurrence accused the Court of bringing
up First Amendment issues not considered by the parties, “cast[ing]
serious doubt on longstanding precedent”—a rare move absent
prompting from concerned parties.158
Justice Breyer’s Dissent159

C.
1.

The Opt-Out System

Justice Breyer’s dissent focused on the statement in Hudson
that “the Union cannot be faulted for calculating its fee on the basis
of its expenses during the preceding year.” 160 According to the
dissent, that was exactly what the Local did in this case.161 Justice
Breyer pointed to the fact that, since Hudson was decided, employers
and unions have relied on the idea that fees collected by unions could
be based on an accounting of chargeable expenses made in the prior
year.162 As he viewed the issue, the existing opt-out framework was
sufficient to protect nonmember workers while compensating the
union for its expenses incurred as collective bargainer.163

154

See id. at 2298.
Id. at 2298–99.
156
Id. at 2299.
157
See id.
158
See id.
159
See id. at 2299–2307 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan joined
Justice Breyer’s dissent. See id. at 2299.
160
Id. at 2299 (quoting Chic. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475
U.S. 292, 307 n.18 (1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
161
Id.
162
Id. at 2299–2300.
163
See id. at 2300.
155
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Justice Breyer meticulously explained how the yearly
accounting involved in the opt-out method operated to provide fair
results to nonmembers over the long term.164 By capping a year’s
fees at the amount of the prior year’s actual chargeable expenses,
“what the objecting nonmembers lose on the swings they will gain on
the roundabouts.” 165 For Justice Breyer, this system, while
imperfect, is workable and comports with the First Amendment—
which is to say that it complies with the requirements of Abood and
Hudson.166
2.

The Special Assessment

Justice Breyer analyzed the constitutionality of the special
assessment separately as to the nonmembers who objected to the
initial 2005 Hudson notice and as to the nonmembers who did not
initially object.167 He concluded that the special assessment did not
violate the First Amendment rights of the initial objectors because, as
described above, they ended up paying less in retrospect than the
union was actually entitled to charge them. 168 Justice Breyer also
claimed that, even if it had not been the case that these nonmembers
underpaid for the year in question, he would still find no
constitutional violation in determining their chargeable percentage
based on the prior year’s financial statements.169 This is due to the
fact that, notwithstanding the Local’s admission that none of the
special assessment would be chargeable in this particular instance,
projecting the amount of special assessments that will end up being
chargeable will almost always be a very difficult task.170 The logic
and long-run fairness of the current system of using the prior year as
the determinant of the current year’s fees becomes manifest given
164

Id. at 2301.
Id.
166
See id. at 2300–03. Justice Breyer acknowledged that the possibility
that an objecting nonmember’s fee contribution will help pay for a non-chargeable
political expenditure is always present. Id. at 2301. “Nonetheless this kind of
system enjoys an offsetting administrative virtue,” in that it is based on audited
accounts and not predictions. Id.
167
Id. at 2302.
168
Id.
169
See id. at 2302–03.
170
See id.
165
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such a complicated endeavor.171 The fact that, in this case, the Local
claimed that most if not all of the special assessment would go
toward a political campaign was unfortunate because it is not likely
to be representative of the vast majority of cases where special
assessments are levied. 172 In the event that expenditures are
misclassified or improperly imposed, nonmembers have at their
disposal procedures for challenging the chargeability of expenses.173
Justice Breyer contended that this is sufficient to vindicate objecting
nonmembers’ First Amendment rights.174
According to Justice Breyer, nonmembers who failed to
initially object upon receipt of the annual Hudson notice have a
stronger case than their counterparts to object to the imposition of the
special assessment. 175 Justice Breyer claimed that this is because
these nonmembers will be forced to pay the entire special
assessment, not just some percentage of it. 176 Nonetheless, he
argued, the same administrative difficulties that apply to determining
chargeable expenses prior to a post-expenditure accounting make a
compelling case that even initial non-objectors should not be allowed
to later object to a special assessment.177
3.

The Likelihood of a First Amendment Violation

Justice Breyer was convinced that, in most cases, actual
deprivation of First Amendment rights is unlikely to occur. 178 He
171

See id. at 2303.
See id. Justice Breyer echoed Justice Sotomayor’s concern that a
nonmember may be able to object to any special assessment, even one strictly for
additional chargeable expenses. Id. He argued that nothing in the majority opinion
would prevent such an outcome. Id.
173
See id. at 2304. If an objecting nonmember is not satisfied with the
union’s determinations, the union will pay for arbitration before the American
Arbitration Association. Id.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id. Presumably, this would increase the likelihood that nonmembers
who did not initially object would end up paying for more than their share of a
given year’s chargeable expenses. This, in turn, would increase the possibility that
they would subsidize some union projects with which they disagree.
177
Id. at 2304–05. For example, should an initial non-objector (or an
initial objector, for that matter) be allowed to object to a special assessment brought
on by unexpected, but perfectly legitimate chargeable expenses? See id. at 2305.
172
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explained his reasoning as follows. A regular (usually annual)
opportunity to object to paying the equivalent of full dues provides
the nonmember with adequate protection against the unconstitutional
use of his funds for political purposes.179 Employees are well aware
that unions spend money in furtherance of political positions. 180
Nonmembers who generally oppose the union’s politics will usually
object at each given opportunity.181 Of those who would only choose
to object to special assessments, there are likely many who would do
so not for ideological reasons, but merely because they wish to save
money.182 Objection on financial, rather than free speech grounds, is
not subject to constitutional protection. 183 Even if an objection
would have been based on First Amendment concerns, the would-be
objector can always make an objection the next year, at which point
his or her lessened fees will be based on the spending in the prior
year that was actually objected to.184
4.

The Court Entering the Political Realm

Finally, Justice Breyer criticized the Court for wading into a
hotly contested political issue, especially given that its holding was
not specifically requested or argued by either party.185 He expressed
his concern that the majority’s holding could be construed as
pertaining to all nonmember union fees, not just special
assessments. 186 Justice Breyer concluded by agreeing with Justice
Sotomayor’s concurrence insofar as it relates to the inappropriateness
of taking on a constitutional issue without the “benefit of
argument.” 187 He made his concern known that “the opinion will
play a central role in an ongoing, intense political debate.”188
178

See id. at 2305–06.
Id. at 2305.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id.
183
See id.
184
See id. at 2306.
185
See id. at 2306–07.
186
Id. at 2306.
187
Id. at 2306–07.
188
Id. at 2306.
179
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KNOX IN CONTEXT

Does Knox Change Anything?

The majority’s holding in Knox may seem unremarkable
when one considers the legal ground on which it sits, i.e., Abood and
Hudson.189 Given the pains the Court had taken to protect the First
Amendment rights of nonmembers in the past when annual fees were
being assessed, it should not be surprising that a special assessment
for admittedly political purposes was subject to extreme
skepticism.190 The majority was clearly more inclined to err on the
side of overprotecting objecting nonmembers than ensuring that
unions got every penny of contributions to which they were
entitled.191
Indeed, one gets the sense reading the opinion that the
holding in Knox is a foregone conclusion.192 As suggested above,
even SEIU seemed to understand the futility of its position, as
indicated by its suggested refund to the plaintiff class.193 The Court
went so far as to admonish the Ninth Circuit by repeating, verbatim, a
footnote from Hudson explaining that the goal of any fee collection
system should be the minimization of the likelihood of First
Amendment violations, as opposed to a balancing of employer,
employee, and union interests. 194 But if the answer appears clear
given the precedent (Justice Breyer’s dissent notwithstanding), why
hear the case at all?
189

See supra Part III.
Justice Breyer thought the fact the union informed employees that it
intended to use the special assessment “camouflaged” the real problems, which
dealt with administrative feasibility. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2303 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
191
See, e.g., id. at 2295 (majority opinion) (“Which side should bear [the
risk of underpayment or overpayment]? The answer is obvious: the side whose
constitutional rights are not at stake.”).
192
Even the question the Court chose to consider seems to suggest the
outcome: “In this case, we decide whether the First Amendment allows a publicsector union to require objecting nonmembers to pay a special fee for the purpose
of financing the union’s political and ideological activities.” Id. at 2284.
193
See id. at 2287.
194
Id. at 2291 n.3 (quoting Chi. Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson,
475 U.S. 292, 303 n.11 (1986)).
190
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Why Hear the Case?

Two answers to this question are discernable from the
opinion. First, and most obviously, the Court chose to reverse what it
considered an erroneous decision by the Ninth Circuit.195 Allowing a
misreading of Hudson to persist as the law in a prominent circuit
would place the First Amendment rights of nonmembers at a
heightened risk—something this Court was unwilling to do.196
A more conspiratorial possibility is one that is hinted at in
both Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence and Justice Breyer’s dissent:
the Court is seeking to open the door to the possibility of requiring
opt-in provisions for all collections of nonmember fees, not just for
special assessments.197 The majority spoke more than once to what it
saw as the dangerous proximity between opt-out systems and First
Amendment violations.198 The Court’s language leaves no doubt as
to the majority’s dislike of the current state of law regarding union
collection of nonmember fees. It is possible that the Court is paving
the way for future challenges to the constitutionality of the traditional
opt-out system for all nonmember contributions.

195

Id. at 2296.
See id. at 2295–96 (“First Amendment values [would be] at serious risk
if the government [could] compel a particular citizen, or a discrete group of
citizens, to pay special subsidies for speech on the side that [the government]
favors.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
197
See id. at 2299 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[W]hile the majority’s
novel rule is, on its face, limited to special assessments and dues increases, the
majority strongly hints that this line may not long endure.”); id. at 2306 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“The decision is particularly unfortunate given the fact that each
reason the Court offers in support of its ‘opt-in’ conclusion seems in logic to apply,
not just to special assessments, but to ordinary yearly fee charges as well.”).
198
See id. at 2291 (majority opinion) (“By authorizing a union to collect
fees from nonmembers and permitting the use of an opt-out system for the
collection of fees levied to cover nonchargeable expenses, our prior decisions
approach, if they do not cross, the limit of what the First Amendment can
tolerate.”); id. at 2293 (“Our cases have tolerated a substantial impingement on
First Amendment rights by allowing unions to impose an opt-out requirement at
all.”); id. at 2295 (“As we have noted, by allowing unions to collect any fees from
nonmembers and by permitting unions to use opt-out . . . schemes when annual
dues are billed, our cases have substantially impinged upon the First Amendment
rights of nonmembers.”).
196
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The Larger Union Struggle

The question remains as to where Knox fits into the larger
picture of the changing role of unions—especially public employee
unions. 199 Coming as it did on the heels of the union defeats in
Wisconsin and California,200 it is easy to view Knox as a sign of the
times, another step toward eventual irrelevance for organized labor.
This interpretation may indeed be accurate, and would certainly
please a number of the labor movement’s critics.201
But organized labor has its share of modern supporters, too.202
They argue, among other things that, “the decline of unionism is part
199

Although the reasoning appears to apply to all unions and the
nonmembers they represent, the Knox decision, by the terms of the question
presented, applies only to public employee unions. See id. at 2284. The majority
refers several times to public employee unions, but the Court’s analysis of United
States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001), early in the opinion suggests that
the reasoning might apply to the forced subsidization of any speech. Id. at 2289.
Unlike the Abood decision, the Court in Knox does not attempt to reconcile any
discrepancies that may exists in analyzing public versus private union fee
collection from nonmembers. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,
229-30 (1977). See generally Knox, 132 S. Ct. 2277.
200
See supra Part I.
201
Labor has long had its share of critics. See, e.g., RICHARD B. FREEMAN
& JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 6 (1984) (“[Union] wage increases
have harmful economic effects, reducing the national output and distorting the
distributions of income.”); N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 629
(Jack W. Calhoun et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007) (“When a union raises wages above the
equilibrium level, it raises the quantity of labor supplied and reduces the quantity of
labor demanded, resulting in unemployment.”); Milton Friedman, Milton Friedman
on Labor Unions – Free to Choose, YOUTUBE (Feb. 22, 2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tefm8wxCQdg (arguing that unions can only
increase wages for members by foreclosing opportunities to nonmembers, whereas
increased wages due to market competition among employers comes at no one’s
expense).
202
See, e.g., FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 201, at 8 (“Collective rather
than individual bargaining with an employer is necessary for effective voice at the
workplace . . . .”); YATES, supra note 5, at 41 (“While the effect of unionization
(with all other variables held constant) varies from group to group, it is always
significantly positive. . . . That unions improve the wages and benefits of workers
is something all workers should know . . . .”); Michael Moore, Michael Moore:
Autoworkers Union Built U.S. Middle Class, YOUTUBE (Dec. 4, 2008),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kE6e5HWH8II; Robert Reich, The Non ZeroSum Society, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 29, 2013, 7:40 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-reich/union-membership
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of a cycle that will inevitably swing back to favour [sic]
unionization.”203 The November 2012 regular election in California
would seem to support their theory—California ballot Propositions
30 and 32, both steadfastly supported by union leadership, were
settled in favor of organized labor.204 It would appear that, statewide,
California sentiment generally is more in favor of, and more willing
to finance, union labor than the municipalities of San Diego and San
Jose.205
Proposition 30 increased some state taxes and prevented
others from being cut. 206 According to California Governor Jerry
Brown, failure to pass the measure would have resulted in spending
cuts that would have damaged public schools and diminished public
safety. 207 Proposition 32 would have prevented unions from
deducting money from members’ paychecks to be used for political
purposes (essentially creating an opt-in system for all political
contributions to unions from members and nonmembers alike) as
well as banned contributions to political candidates by unions and
corporations.208 Whether the November 2012 California election was

rate_b_2572819.html (arguing that employees of large companies such as WalMart and McDonald’s should be unionized and that American law should be more
favorable to organized labor).
203
FAIRBROTHER & GRIFFIN, supra note 5, at 11.
204
See Voters Protect Schools, Pass Prop. 30, Defeat 32, SEIU LOCAL
521 (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.seiu521.org/2012/thank-you/ (thanking California
voters for their willingness “to invest in our public schools” and defeating “a
deceptive ballot measure aimed at silencing workers and their unions”).
205
See Saillant & Perry, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
206
See Official Voter Information Guide, Text of Proposed Laws for
Proposition 30: “The Schools and Local Public Safety Protection Act of 2012”,
SEC’Y
OF
ST.,
80–84,
available
at
CAL.
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2012/general/pdf/text-proposed-laws-v2.pdf (last visited
Mar. 17, 2013).
207
Inojlt, Vote Yes on Proposition 30: Jerry Brown’s Budget Plan, DAILY
KOS
(Oct.
9,
2012,
11:12
PM),
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/10/10/1142494/-Vote-Yes-on-Proposition-30Jerry-Brown-s-Budget-Plan.
208
CAL. SEC’Y OF ST., PROPOSITION 32, SECTION 2: “THE STOP SPECIAL
INTEREST MONEY NOW ACT”, in OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE: TEXT OF
PROPOSED
LAWS
80,
93–94
(2012),
available
at
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2012/general/pdf/text-proposed-laws-v2.pdf (last visited
Mar. 17, 2013).
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an outlier in an otherwise anti-union trend or the beginning of a
reversal of organized labor’s fortunes remains to be seen.
The long-term trends described in Part II do not bode well for
unions generally, and as noted, even public sector unions have been
on the decline since 2009. 209 Overall, it is fair to say that the
twentieth century saw a rise and fall of organized labor in
America.210 It may also prove true that, California’s November 2012
election notwithstanding, recent political events will serve to
embolden anti-union politicians and activists and lead them to push
for more cost-cutting measures that limit union rights.211
D.

The Cost of Unions

The dramatic increase in federal debt has been well
publicized.212 Less well known is the dramatic increase in state debt
in recent years.213 One method of getting state government budgets
under control is to lower the costs of public payrolls.214 In the past
year alone there have been budget-based legislative disputes between
state governments and public employee unions in Michigan,
Wisconsin, California, Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, New Jersey, and
Connecticut, to name a few. 215 Budget constraints may prove the

209

See supra Part II.A and accompanying notes.
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211
See, e.g., Kocieniewski, supra note 4; see also Times Topics-Organized
Labor,
N.Y.
TIMES,
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ex.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2013).
212
See, e.g., Mary Kate Cary, No, Paul Krugman, Let’s Not ‘Kick that
Can’, US NEWS (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/mary-katecary/2013/02/08/paul-krugman-is-wrong-about-our-national-debt.
213
Total state debt as a percentage of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product has
grown from 3.5% in 1960 to 7.5% in 2009. US State Government Debt Since 1900,
U.S. GOV’T DEBT, http://www.usgovernmentdebt.us/state_debt (last visited Oct. 7,
2013).
214
California alone spent nearly $25 billion on state employees in 2012.
Schedule 4, Position and Salary Cost Estimates, CAL. ST. BUDGET, available at
http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/2013-14/pdf/BudgetSummary/BS_SCH4.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 4, 2013).
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210

886

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

33-2

deciding factor when it comes to determining the continued viability
of public sector unions.216
State employee pension obligations also weigh heavily in
state government decision-making—“on average, a tax increase of
$1,385 per U.S. household per year would be required, starting
immediately and growing with the size of the public sector” to keep
up with state and local public employee pension costs. 217
Meanwhile, citizens seem to be migrating from states with the
highest public employee expenses to states with the lowest.218 Knox
may provide an arrow in the quiver of states seeking to cut costs by
reducing expenditures on government employees.
Unions, and SEIU in particular, are putting on a brave face in
spite of the anti-union trends.219 SEIU continues to push its agenda
at all levels of government.220 If union labor is to remain relevant,

216

The state budget problem is exacerbated by the fact that heavily
unionized states tend to be considered less business friendly, and thus less able to
generate the business activity necessary to generate tax revenue. See Michael
Marlow, The Huge Cost of Public Unions, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 24, 2012),
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/huge-cost-public-unions-article-1.1143138.
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http://www.seiu.org (last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
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influencing politics may be its best hope.221 The November 2012
California election is a clear example of a union political victory.222
VII.

CONCLUSION

By the time Knox was decided in June of 2012, unions had
long been on the decline. Private sector unions had been particularly
hard-hit since reaching their membership peak in the 1950s.223 While
public sector union membership has steadily gained as a percentage
of total union members, government unions have shrunk over the
past few years. 224 Knox dealt with an issue near and dear to the
hearts of both public and private sector unions: their ability to compel
contributions from nonmembers whom they represent in collective
bargaining.225
While, on its face, Knox deals only with public unions, its
logic seems to apply to labor unions generally.226 Standing on the
opinions in Abood and Hudson, the Court held that a public sector
union could not collect funds from nonmembers via a special
assessment in order to fund political or ideological activities.227 A
nonmember’s First Amendment right not to subsidize speech with
which he or she disagrees strongly outweighed the desire on the part
of a union to exact contributions from those who choose not to join
the union’s ranks.228
While the Court did not find the commonly used technique
for calculating chargeable expenses—basing the current year’s
221

See FAIRBROTHER & GRIFFIN, supra note 5, at 220 (“Politics has
remained the most stable dimension of union strategy. Unions continue to endorse
and offer financial and other in-kind forms of support to pro-union candidates,
most of whom are Democrats, while working to defeat anti-union candidates most
of whom are Republicans.”).
222
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223
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224
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See Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277
(2012).
226
Cf. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (stating that the
existence of state action was not determinative in deciding whether agency shop
arrangements violated workers’ First Amendment rights).
227
Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2296.
228
Id. at 2294.
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assessment on the prior year’s financial records—unconstitutional,
the majority’s language strongly suggested that such a system came
dangerously close to running afoul of the First Amendment. 229
Surely, the Court reasoned, no expansion of a union’s ability to
compel fees from nonmembers could be constitutionally allowed.230
Henceforth, any special assessment to raise funds to be used
for a union’s political or ideological campaigns (and possibly any
special assessment at all) requires issuing a fresh Hudson notice.231
Nonmembers must affirmatively opt in before any additional money
can be deducted from their paychecks on behalf of the union.232
While this result was probably inevitable given the case law,
it is difficult to view the holding as anything other than another blow
to the plight of unions, particularly government employee unions.
After the failed June 2012 recall election of Governor Scott Walker
in Wisconsin and the passage of union-opposed ballot measures in
the California cities of San Jose and San Diego, the Knox decision
seemed to confirm that organized labor was caught in a downward
spiral.
Given the current political, legal, and economic climate,
union labor seems destined for irrelevance. Recent election results to
the contrary in the November 2012 California general election are
likely to be a mere Pyrrhic victory for the union cause. Government
budget constraints and the high costs of unionized public workers and
their pensions will ultimately be the undoing of public sector unions.
Organized government labor will eventually go the way of its private
counterpart and become a negligible force in American politics and
economics.
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